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01 September 2017 @ 12:04 pm
Exception handling in mission-critical systems  
In "Double.NaN != Double.NaN" discussion, [personal profile] ppk_ptichkin linked to Ariane 5 investigation.

My conclusions based on that investigation:
1) Delete unused code from the solution.
2) Make sure that the application is still functional, even in case when an exception happens.
3) Do integration tests.



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http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents/Ariane5accidentreport.html
e) At 36.7 seconds after H0 (approx. 30 seconds after lift-off) the computer within the back-up inertial reference system, which was working on stand-by for guidance and attitude control, became inoperative. This was caused by an internal variable related to the horizontal velocity of the launcher exceeding a limit which existed in the software of this computer.

f) Approx. 0.05 seconds later the active inertial reference system, identical to the back-up system in hardware and software, failed for the same reason. Since the back-up inertial system was already inoperative, correct guidance and attitude information could no longer be obtained and loss of the mission was inevitable.

g) As a result of its failure, the active inertial reference system transmitted essentially diagnostic information to the launcher's main computer, where it was interpreted as flight data and used for flight control calculations.

h) On the basis of those calculations the main computer commanded the booster nozzles, and somewhat later the main engine nozzle also, to make a large correction for an attitude deviation that had not occurred.

i) A rapid change of attitude occurred which caused the launcher to disintegrate at 39 seconds after H0 due to aerodynamic forces.

.....

m) The inertial reference system of Ariane 5 is essentially common to a system which is presently flying on Ariane 4. The part of the software which caused the interruption in the inertial system computers is used before launch to align the inertial reference system and, in Ariane 4, also to enable a rapid realignment of the system in case of a late hold in the countdown. This realignment function, which does not serve any purpose on Ariane 5, was nevertheless retained for commonality reasons and allowed, as in Ariane 4, to operate for approx. 40 seconds after lift-off.

n) During design of the software of the inertial reference system used for Ariane 4 and Ariane 5, a decision was taken that it was not necessary to protect the inertial system computer from being made inoperative by an excessive value of the variable related to the horizontal velocity, a protection which was provided for several other variables of the alignment software. When taking this design decision, it was not analysed or fully understood which values this particular variable might assume when the alignment software was allowed to operate after lift-off.

o) In Ariane 4 flights using the same type of inertial reference system there has been no such failure because the trajectory during the first 40 seconds of flight is such that the particular variable related to horizontal velocity cannot reach, with an adequate operational margin, a value beyond the limit present in the software.

p) Ariane 5 has a high initial acceleration and a trajectory which leads to a build-up of horizontal velocity which is five times more rapid than for Ariane 4. The higher horizontal velocity of Ariane 5 generated, within the 40-second timeframe, the excessive value which caused the inertial system computers to cease operation.

.....

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of its analyses and conclusions, the Board makes the following recommendations.

R1 Switch off the alignment function of the inertial reference system immediately after lift-off. More generally, no software function should run during flight unless it is needed.

R2 Prepare a test facility including as much real equipment as technically feasible, inject realistic input data, and perform complete, closed-loop, system testing. Complete simulations must take place before any mission. A high test coverage has to be obtained.

R3 Do not allow any sensor, such as the inertial reference system, to stop sending best effort data.
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http://juan-gandhi.dreamwidth.org/4017681.html?thread=111407633#cmt111407633

Originally posted at: http://dennisgorelik.dreamwidth.org/139374.html
 
 
 
krechkrech on September 6th, 2017 01:22 am (UTC)
P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) := UC_16S_EN_16NS (TDB.T_ENTIER_16S ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BH) * G_M_INFO_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH)))

Язык термоядерного ада (с)

P.S.
что-то снова пошло не так:
https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/09/05/va-239-mission-status-center/
Dennis Gorelikdennisgorelik on September 6th, 2017 03:20 am (UTC)
> P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH)

Where did you see that?

> что-то снова пошло не так

At least this time they did not blow up the rocket.
krechkrech on September 6th, 2017 09:24 pm (UTC)